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3. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space' 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
. 
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.jiiuttle Mission STS-55 was launched at 10:50 a.m. local 4/26/93 
1
ORIGINAL PAGE

COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
0	 1.0 Summary 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 22 March 1993 for the first launch attempt. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
The launch of STS-55 was aborted at T-3 seconds due to a 
problem with the SS #3 oxidizer preburner purge check valve. 
A post drain inspection of the vehicle after the abort revealed 
no significant anomalies. Tiles were generally undamaged from 
SSME ignition and FIREX water spray with the exception of 15-20 
small damage sites (1/2-inch diameter maximum) on the base heat 
shield and aft RCS stingers. The Orbiter SSME #2 Dome Mounted 
Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket appeared to be scorched or 
discolored. 
A total of 42 films and videos were reviewed after the abort. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. After SSME shut 
down, burning hydrogen drifted upward to the base heat shield 
scorching the SS #2 DMHS panels, burning LH aft stinger RCS 
thruster paper covers, and burning insulation on the LH2 T-0 
umbilical disconnect lines. 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
• was conducted on 23 April 1993. The detailed walkdown of Launch 
Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-102 Columbia (14th flight), ET-56 (LWT 49), and BI-057 
SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies. The launch, scrubbed on 
April 24th prior to cryoloading due to an Orbiter IMU #2 
problem, was re-scheduled for 26 April 1993. 
A repeat of the pre-launch debris inspection had not been 
planned since the ML? deck was subject to controlled access. 
The only work to be performed on April 25th consisted of 
topping off the water in the SRB sound suppression water 
troughs and adjusting the film in the ML? deck cameras. During 
these activities, 5 stainless steel 5/8-inch diameter bolts 
from the handrails were found under the E-17 Camera wedge 
mount. Additional debris inspections were performed throughout 
the day. Seven more pieces of hardware (3 bolts, 1 nut, and 3 
welding rods) were found under the raised deck adjacent to the 
SSME exhaust hole. 
The vehicle 
were no Lat 
violations. 
lished data 
on the TPS 
detected no 
No unusual
was cryoloaded for flight on 26 April 1993. There

rich Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria

There were no ice conditions outside of the estab-

base. The External Tank exhibited light condensate

acreage. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak sensor

significant hydrogen leakage during the cryoload.

vapors or cryogenic drips were visible during 
•	 tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
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A 4-inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack in the -Y vertical strut 
cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout 
interface propagated outboard. A second crack, 10 inches long, 
by 1/4-inch wide occurred along t-he bondline in the center of 
the cable tray closeout and propagated inboard. Continued 
propagation of both cracks in flight would most 'likely result 
in one long crack on the forward surface of the cable tray 
foam. The cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled with 
ice or frost. The condition was acceptable for flight per the 
NSTS-08303 criteria. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware or TPS materials were found. EPON shim material 
on the south hoiddown posts was intact. There was no visual 
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown 
posts. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were found. Damage 
to the facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 100 films and videos were analyzed as part of the 
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight 
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No 
stud hang-ups occurred and no ordnance debris fell from any of 
the HDP DCS/stud holes. Al]. T-0 umbilicals operated properly. 
An electromagnetic disturbance was detected by UHF Receiver #4 
and the Lightning Detector and Ranging System (LDAR) in the 
vicinity of the vehicle 47-50 seconds MET. Although localized 
flow condensation formed on various parts of the vehicle during 
ascent, no sign of the electrostatic discharge event was 
visible on the long range trackers. 
On-orbit imagery, ET/ORB umbilical cameras and the flight crew 
handheld photography, revealed nominal SRB and ET separations. 
The right bipod jack pad TPS closeout was missing. Six divots 
were present in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. One 
divot occurred in the intertank acreage between the left bipod 
ramp closeout and the -Y thrust panel. At least 15-20 small 
"popcorn "
 type divots were visible on intertank stringer heads 
in an area just forward of the bipods. Three divots were 
present in the LH2 tank acreage near the LH2 tank-to-ix-itertank 
flange closeout. Loss of TPS on the +Z side of the ET near the 
Orbiter nose is a potential threat to lower surface tiles. 
Film analysis also showed orbiter flight performance, landing 
gear extension, wheel touchdown, drag •chute deployment, and 
vehicle rollout were normal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. The right frustum was missing no TPS, but had 32 
MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. The LH frustum had a total of 21 
MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. MSA-2 was missing from five areas 
and deborided in two areas on the LH aft skirt acreage TPS. Part 
of the HDP #3 inboard sidewall EPON shim material was missing 
and may have been the two pieces observed in the film review 
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? seated properly. 
A post landing inspection of OV-102 was conducted after the 
landing at ADFRF/EAFB. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 143 
hits, of which 13 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. 
The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 128 hits, of which 10 
had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these 
numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of 
similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris 
hits was near average and the number of hits one inch or larger 
was less than average. Inspection of the RH ET/ORB attach point 
(EO-3) revealed the hole-plugger had not seated fully and was 
obstructed by a frangible nut half. Two ordnance fragments were 
found on the runway below the L02 ET/ORB umbilical after the ET 
doors were opened. EQ-i and EO-2 ET/Orbiter separation devices 
appeared to have functioned properly. 
A post landing inspection of EAFB Runway 22 was performed 
immediately after landing. Eleven pieces of black tile were 
recovered in the approximate area of the drag chute deployment. 
These tile fragments originated from the rudder/speed brake 
"stinger", which is an area damaged on previous uses of the 
drag chute by contact with the parachute riser lines. Aside 
from the damage to the vertical stabilizer stinger, the drag 
chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag chute 
hardware was recovered and appeared to be in good condition. 
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a 
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples from sources 
such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM exhaust residue, natural landing 
site products, organics, and paint. These residual sampling 
data do not indicate a single source of damaging debris as all 
of the observed materials have been documented previously in 
post-landing sample reports. The residual sample data also 
showed no debris trends when compared to previous mission data. 
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies were observed during the 
STS-55 mission assessment.
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2.0 ABORT
	 S 
A Pre-Launch inspection of Pad 39A and the flight hardware was 
performed on 21 March 1993 from 1000-1100 hours. Other than a 
piece of loose thermal curtain tape on the LH SRB aft skirt 
near HDP #5, no vehicle anomalies were found. 
The launch of STS-55 was aborted at T-3 seconds due to a 
problem with the SS #3 oxidizer preburner purge check valve. 
2.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 22 March 1993 from 0500 to 0710 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 63.5 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity: 	 86.5 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 7.2 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 074 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
2.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter RCC panel anomalies were observed. A coating of 
black paint was missing from three tiles on the RH wing leading 
edge extension (IPR 55V-0119). All RCS thruster paper covers 
and water spray boiler plugs were intact. Typical ice and frost 
accumulations were present at the SS #2 heat shield-to-nozzle 
interfaces. The SSME #1 and #2 heat shields and the base heat 
shield tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual 
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted 
heat shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME 
nozzles. 
2.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The STI 
portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case tempera-
tures between 64 and 66 degrees Fahrenheit (F) . In comparison, 
temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot 
radiometer ranged from 66 to 67 degrees F and the SRB Ground 
Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured temperatiires of 66 
degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees 
F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk 
Temperature (PT) supplied by MTI was 65 degrees F, which was 
within the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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0	 2.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'StJPFICE' was run 
from 0215 to 1015 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was no condensate or ice/frost accumulations on the L02 
tank ogive. Some light condensate was present on the L02 tank 
barrel section. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble valve 
cover was intact. The pressurization line and support ramps 
were in nominal configuration. The portable STI measured 
surface temperatures that averaged 56 degrees F on the ogive 
and 53 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, the 
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 54 
degrees F on the ogive and 52 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 51 degrees F on the ogive and 48 
degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in 
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank 
flanges. Small ice balls had formed at two places where inter-
tank stringers were attached to the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange (-Z side) . Typical ice/frost accumulations and no 
unusual vapors were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. 
•	 The portable STI measured an average surface temperature of 66 
degrees F on the intertank. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 54 
degrees F. on the upper LH2 tank and 56 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. . In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 56 degrees F on both the upper and 
lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 46 degrees F 
on the upper LH2 tank and 52 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Some 
ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut 
fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost formations, 1/4-1/2 inch in 
size, had accumulated on the aft dome manhole cover bondlines. 
A 4-inch long crack was present in the -Y vertical strut cable 
tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface. 
The 1/4-inch wide crack exhibited no offset and was not filled 
with ice or frost. The appearance of the crack was expected due 
to the elimination of the stress relief gap at the factory. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
.	
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. There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were filled 
with ice and frost, which also covered portions of the straight 
section between the bellows. Two small ice balls had formed on 
the aft side of the LH2 feedline closeout. 
The usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the top, aft, 
and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. 
Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and 
plate gap purge vents. Light ice/frost was present on the aft 
pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline indicating a thermal 
short. A typical ice/frost ring had formed on the cable tray 
vent hole. Ice/frost had formed on the 17-inch flapper valve 
actuator access port foam plug closeout forward corner as a 
result of a small cold purge gas leak. No unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, 
and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of four OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a 4-inch crack in the -Y vertical strut 
cable tray forward surface near the lorigeron closeout inter-
face. The 1/4-inch wide crack exhibited no offset and was not 
filled with ice or frost. The condition was acceptable for 
launch per NSTS-08303 criteria and CR SO41254C. 
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the LH2 feedline bellows, recirculation line bellows and 
burst discs, and on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents. The 
formations were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 004 documented ice/frost accumulation at the TPS repair 
bondline of the aft dome +Z manhole cover. The condition was 
acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
S
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2.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent 
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had 
accumulated on the GtJCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of 
the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. Small icicles less than 1/2 inch 
in length had formed on the north GOX vent duct, but had melted 
prior to the time of launch.
. 
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A coating of black paint was missing from three tiles

on the right wing leading edge extension 
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Typical amounts of ice and frost had formed on the ET/ORB LH2 
umbilical, purge vents, cable tray vent hole, and recirculation 
line bellows. Ice/frost on the LH2 feedline bellows began to S encroach on the straight (spool) section. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, 
and launch.
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0	 2.6 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSPECTION 
A post drain inspection of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39A 
from 1530 to 1715 hours on 22 March 1993. 
The Orbiter SS
	 #2 Dome Mounted Heat Shield (D!S) closeout 
blanket appeared to be scorched (discolored). 
Tiles were generally undamaged from SSME ignition and FIREX 
water spray with the exception of 15-20 small damage sites 
(1/2-inch diameter maximum) on the base heat shield and aft RCS 
stingers. Most of the paper covers on the aft RCS thruster 
nozzles were torn. 
- There was no visible damage on the External Tank nosecone, 
fairing, or foot print area. No topcoat was missing. The tumble 
valve cover was intact. 
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank, 
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage. 
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose 
foam or TPS damage was visible. Ice in the feedline bellows had 
melted. 
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent 
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam. 
The 4-inch crack in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray 
forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Inspection) was 
still visible. 
Vapor was emanating from an ice/frost spot on the aft dome -z 
manhole cover closeout and from a location on the aft dome apex 
between the two manhole covers. 
No anomalies were observed on the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) 
or on the MLP deck/facility. 
No significant vehicle damage was observed during the prelimi- 
nary external post drain inspection. No IPR's were generated as 
a result of this inspection. 
A subsequent hands-on inspection of the L02 feedline revealed 
two anomalies. A Problem Report was taken against damaged foam 
on the feedline adjacent to the station XT-1129 bracket. The 
area was repaired with PDL. The second anomaly involved crushed 
foam on the intertank splice forward of the feedline bracket, 
station XT-1129. This condition was accepted for flight by MRB 
approval due to inaccessibility. [1
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Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with 
adjacent LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam 
16	 CIL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
3.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 23 April 1993 at 0930 hours 
with the following key personnel present: 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Dean LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
R. Hillard MTI	 - LSS SRN Processing 
S. Otto MMMSS- LSS ET Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
.assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
S	 i
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3 1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/P1W DEBRIS INSPECTION 	 0 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 23 April 1993 from 1030 - 1130 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-102 Columbia (14th flight), ET-56 
(LWT 49), and BI-057 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies or. debris issues. 
A metal part tag, 2.5" x 0.625" in size and stamped with the 
numbers 11 79K 80240-13", lay against Orbiter tile on top of the 
Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) inflated seal. The tag was removed by 
pad operations personnel inside the white room by moving the 
inflated seal. No damage to Orbiter tiles was detected. 
A small cotter pin in the LH2 TSM south ladder upper hand ring 
support was replaced real-time by pad technicians with a large 
pull ring. The replacement matched the ring in the lower 
support. 
Six pieces of K5NA in the HDP #5 haunch area and two objects 
(the largest measuring 3"xO.75"xO.5") in the HDP #1 haunch area 
were removed real-time by pad technicians. The MLP deck and 
areas under the raised deck were swept/vacuumed again prior 
to launch to remove small debris items, such as sand, rust 
flakes, and paint chips. No items were entered in S0007, 
Appendix K. 
The launch, scrubbed on April 24th prior to cryoloading due to 
an Orbiter IMU #2 problem, was re-scheduled for 26 April 1993. 
A repeat of the pre-launch debris inspection had not been 
planned since the MLP deck was subject to controlled access. 
The only work to be performed on 25 April 1993 consisted of 
topping off the water in the SRB sound suppression water 
troughs and adjusting the film in the MLP deck cameras. During 
these activities, 5 stainless steel 5/8-inch diameter bolts 
from the handrails were found under the E-17 Camera wedge mount 
Additional debris inspections were performed throughout the 
day. The following items were found under the raised deck 
radiation shield attach plates along side the sound suppression 
water nozzles and within 6 inches of the edge of the SSME 
exhaust hole north side: 
1. 5" long by 0.75" diameter bolt 
2. 4" long by 0.75" diameter bolt 
3. 1.75" long by 0.438" diameter bolt (stainless) 
4. 1.25" diameter nut 
5. 14-inch welding rod 
6. 12-inch welding rod 
7. 9-inch welding rod 
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A series of meetings were held to discuss these recent debris 
issues and the following points were addressed: 
1. Flushing debris out from areas underneath the raised deck by 
the use of water hoses is not completely effective. Pad workers 
should conduct a more detailed inspection using flashlights and 
remove any remaining debris by hand. 
2. Small objects, such as bolts, washers, nuts, and other 
fasteners, are more difficult to control and account for when 
lying loose on the ML? deck. Small objects should never be 
loose on the deck. Fasteners should be in a container when not 
being installed or removed from camera housing covers, handrail 
supports, etc. 
3. Pad workers place small objects in MLP deck cavities, under 
sound suppression water pipes, and on water pipe I-beam 
supports. The apparent reason for this practice is to keep 
objects out of the traffic paths. However, this can also lead 
to more incidents of forgotten or misplaced hardware. Pad 
workers should avoid using ML? cavities and I-beam "shelves" as 
temporary storage places. 
C
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Pre-launch configuration of the bipod jack pad closeouts

after one cryogenic loading 
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. Pre-launch view of the left (-Y) vertical strut cable tray TPS 
after one cryogenic loading. Cracks in the foam typically occur 
in this area due to the elimination of the stress relief cut. 
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4.0 LAUNCH 
STS-55 was launched at 14:50:00.017 GMT (10:50 a.m. local) on 
26 April 1993. 
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 26 April 1993 from 0530 to 0715 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 criteria 
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established 
data base. Ambient weather conditions at the time of the 
inspection were: 
Temperature:	 68.0 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity:	 92.6 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 4.1 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 196 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
4.2 OBBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
The loss of small areas of black paint from three tiles on the 
RH wing leading edge extension upper surface was no constraint 
for flight. Four light, almost white, colored areas on Orbiter 
nose lower surface tiles below the RH FRCS were found to be 
repaired areas. 
Typical ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME #1 and 
#2 heat - shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was present on 
the SSME engine mounted heat shields, but the base heat shield 
tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual tempera-
ture gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat 
shields. 
A cold spot on the inside wall of the SSME #1 nozzle was 
attributed to thin insulation and the attach point of the 
exterior L02 drain line. The presence of the cold spot was not 
an anomaly. No unusual vapors originated from inside the SS 
nozzles. S
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4.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
	 S 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner measured RH and LH 
SRB case temperatures between 68 and 72 degrees Fahrenheit (F). 
In comparison, temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta! 
Land Cyclops spot radiometer ranged from 68 to 72 degrees F and 
the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured 
temperatures ranging from 69 to 74 degrees F. All measured 
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PT) supplied 
by MTI was 67 degrees F, which was within the required range of 
44-86 degrees F 
4.4 EXTERNAL ThuR 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0230 to 1045 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 6. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was no condensate or ice/frost accumulations on the L02 
tank ogive. Some light condensate was present on the L02 tank
	 5 barrel section. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble valve 
cover was intact. The pressurization line and support ramps 
were in nominal configuration. The portable STI measured 
surface temperatures that averaged 66 degrees F on the ogive 
and 64 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, the 
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 67 
degrees F on the ogive and 64 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 58 degrees F on the ogive and 51 
degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. Two ice/frost spots appeared 
on stringers at the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
Typical ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors were 
present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI 
measured an average surface temperature of 71 degrees F on the 
intertank compared to 69 degrees as measured by the Cyclops 
radiometer. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice - or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 62 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 63 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F on both the upper and 
lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 46 degrees F 
on the upper LH2 tank and 43 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
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There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Five 
pressurization line support ice/frost ramps exhibited small 
ice/frost accumulations along the aft edge bondlines. Some 
ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut 
fairing expansion joints. A small crack in the TPS with 
associated ice/frost formation was present at both the +Y and 
-Y vertical strut-to-LH2 tank interface aft edges. 
A 4-inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack in the -Y vertical strut 
cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout 
interface propagated out board. A second crack, 10 inches long 
by 1/4-inch wide, occurred along the bondline in the center of 
the cable tray closeout and propagated inboard. Continued 
propagation of both cracks would most likely result in one long 
crack on the forward surface of the cable tray foam. The cracks 
exhibited no offset and were not filled with ice or frost. The 
condition was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. Less than usual accumulations of 
ice/frost were present on the acreage areas of the umbilical. 
Formation of ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic 
canister purge vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen 
purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. An ice/frost formation with venting 
vapors appeared at the LH2 recirculation line-to-LH2 tank 
acreage interface. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate and some frost was beginning to form. 
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the 
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge 
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro 
canister and plate gap purge vents. Light Ice/frost was present 
on both the aft and forward outboard pyrotechnic canister 
closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. A typical 
ice/frost ring had formed on the cable tray vent hole. Cold 
purge gas was leaking from the 17-inch flapper valve actuator 
access 'port foam plug closeout forward corner. Ice/frost had 
formed as a result. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had 
appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
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The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies consisted 
of nine OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a 4-inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack in 
the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the 
longeron closeout interface propagated outboard. A second 
crack, 10 inches long by 1/4-inch wide, occurred along the 
bondiine in the center of the cable tray closeout and 
propagated inboard. Continued propagation of both cracks would 
most likely result in one long crack on the forward surface of 
the cable tray. The 1/4-inch wide cracks exhibited no offset 
and were not filled with ice or frost. The condition was 
acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria and CR 
SO41254C. 
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the ET/ORB umbilical pyro canister purge vents and LH2 
upper/outboard sections of the purge barrier (baggie). The ice 
and frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 004 documented ice/frost accumulation on the aft dome 
S	 +Z manhole cover TPS repair bondline. The condition was accept--able per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 005 documented ice/frost formations at the LH2 aft dome 
acreage-to-LH2 recirculation line interface. The ice/frost had 
melted prior to the time of launch. 
Anomaly 006 documented an ice/frost formation on the diagonal 
strut tank fitting (TSE strut attach point). The condition was 
acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 007 recorded (documentation only) ice/frost accumula-
tions on the EB fittings (EB-7 and EB-8). 
Anomaly 008 documented an ice/frost formation on the aft side 
of the -Y vertical strut/cable tray TPS closeout. The formation 
was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 009 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost accumula-
tions on the uninsulated parts of the GUCP. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303 criteria. 
C
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4.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent
	 - 
line or GUCP. Some ice and frost, which was expected, had 
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of 
the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles were present on the GOX 
vent ducts at the time of launch.
. 
. 
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OV-102 Columbia (14th flight), ET-56 (LWT 49), BI-057 SRB's
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I ED There was no condensate or ice/frost accumulations on the L02 
tank ogive. Light condensate was present on the barrel section. 
There were no problems with the oval TPS repair. 
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Cold purge gas vapor was visible venting from the intertank 
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A 4-inch long crack in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward 
surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface propagated 
outboard. A second crack, 10-inches long, occurred along the 
bondline in the center of the cable tray closeout and 
S propagated inboard. Continued propagation of both cracks would most likely result in one long crack on the forward surface of the cable tray foam. The condition was acceptable for flight. 
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• A small crack in the TPS with associated ice/frost formation 
was present at both +Y and -Y vertical strut-to-tank interface 
aft edges.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/ORB 
. LH2 umbilical. A typical ice/frost ring had accumulated on the 
cable tray vent hole. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had 
appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
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0	 5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the ML?, FSS and RSS was 
conducted on 26 April 1993 from Launch+1.5 to 3 hours. No 
flight hardware or TPS materials were found. 
SRB ho].ddown post (HDP) erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe 
EPON shim material was intact, but slightly debonded at the 
south-east sidewall of HDP #2. In addition, voids were observed 
in the sidewall shim of HDP's #1, #5 and #6. There was no 
visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south 
holddown posts. All of the north HDP doghouse blast covers were 
in the closed position and exhibited typical erosion. The SRB 
aft skirt purge lines were in place, but slightly damaged. The 
SPB T-0 umbilicals exhibited minor damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed only minor damage. The 
GH2 vent arm was latched on the seventh tooth of the latching 
mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard) . The 
GH2 vent line appeared to have retracted nominally. The GH2 
vent line showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement. The ET 
intertank access structure also sustained typical plume heating 
effects. The GOX vent arm hydraulic panel on the 255 foot level 
was leaking red hydraulic fluid from a hardline/union inter-
face. This fluid dripped all the way down to the 205 foot 
level. 
Typical damage to the facility included: 
1. A detached electrical box cover (2'x 2 1 ) on the FSS 
75 foot level under the stairs. 
2. Three loose signs with missing fasteners on the FSS 
235 foot level elevator sidewalls. Two detached 11255" 
signs on the 255 foot level. 
3. A cracked window on the GOX vent hood -Y side.. 
4. A missing section (12 1 x 4 1 ) of masonry from the bottom 
of the SRB flame deflector. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
An inspection/walkdown of the pad acreage, beach from UCS-10 to 
Titan complex 40, the beach road, the railroad tracks, the 
water areas around the pad and under the flight path was 
completed. No flight hardware or TPS material was found. 
MLP-3 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both .TSM's, at the bottom of both SPB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole.' All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. S
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Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 74 particles 
were imaged in the T+140 to 344 second time period. Thirty-two 
of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 29 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 13 particles were imaged by all 
three radars. The number and signal strength of the detected 
particles was generally comparable to previous missions. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10.
S 
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All south hoiddown post shoe EPON shim material was intact

but slightly debonded at the sidewall of HDP #2 
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0	 - 6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the 
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems 
engineers. There were no PR's, IPR's, or IFA's as a result of 
the film review. 
6.1 ANORT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 42 films and videos, which included 14 high speed 
16mm films, 7 large format 35mm films, and 21 videos, were 
reviewed on 29 March 1993. 
There were no visual anomalies on the external surfaces of the 
three SSME's. Only SSME #1 ran long enough to form a Mach 
diamond, which existed for approximately 1 second. Frost formed 
on the nozzles after shutdown. 
After SSME shutdown, burning hydrogen drifted upward to the 
base heat shield, vertical stabilizer, and under the body flap. 
Film E-18 showed the scorching of DMHS panels on SSME #2, 
burning of LH aft stinger .
 RCS thruster paper covers, and 
burning of insulation on the LH2 T-0 umbilical disconnect 
lines. 
Two thin, rectangular objects, which appeared to be pieces of 
purge barrier (baggie) tape, fell past the field of view (E-16, 
frames 4751 and 4944; E-18, frames 4630 and 5200) 
SSME ignition caused the loss of small pieces of tile surface 
coating material on the base heat shield and RH aft RCS stinger 
(E-17, 19) 
There were no External Tank anomalies. Maximum deflection 
(vehicle "twang") was approximately 14 inches in the -z direc-
tion and 9 inches in the +Z direction. 
There were no SPB anomalies. 
There appeared to be good FIREX water spray coverage of the 
SSME area, the LH2/L02 T-0 umbilical disconnects, and up to the 
ET/ORB LH2 umbilical. Due to an alignment problem with a FIREX 
nozzle, no water reached the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Facilities 
personnel checked the alignment procedure and will take correc-
tive action for the STS-56 launch. 
There were no anomalies with the hydrogen burn ignitors. 
S
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6.2 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 	 0 
A total of 100 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm 
films, twenty 35mm films, four 70mm films, and thirty-five 
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Prior to ignition, free burning hydrogen drifted under the body 
flap. SSME start-up, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal (RSS and CIS-2 STI, OTV 051, 063, 070, 071, 
E-1, 5). Several flashes occurred in the SSME plumes prior to 
and after T-0 (E-2, 3). An orange streak occurred in the SSME
 
plume at 14:50:01.199 GMT. Numerous white flashes were visible 
in the SSNE plume after tower clear (E-52). 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine 
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-76, 77). 
SS ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, 
stable replenish, ignition, liftoff, or tower clear (OTV 009, 
050, 054, 063, 064) 
Two pieces of ice fell from the L02 feedline bellows, XT-1119, 
but did not contact Orbiter tiles (E-65). 
SSME ignition vibration/ acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from a small area on a base heat 
shield tile outboard of SSb #3 (E-17).. 
A white debris particle, which appeared to be tumbling, drifted 
in an easterly direction prior to T-0 (E-30, 36). 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 049, 050, 063). A dark, slender debris 
object fell from the right aft RCS stinger and was most likely 
a tile gap filler (E-17, frame 4255; E-20, frame 4805). Ice, 
12" x 2" in size, fell from the Orbiter LH2 T-0 umbilical 
interface after the carrier plate had disconnected and started 
to retract (E-77). A 3" x 0.5" GSE shim fell from the LH2 T-0 
umbilical carrier plate shortly after T-0 (E-18, frame 4206). 
A small debris particle entered the field-of-view left side, 
moved in the direction of the LH SRB, bounced off the factory 
joint at T-0, and traveled towards the facility. No damage to 
flight hardware was visible (E-48).
	
is 
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GUCP disconnect and retraction from the ET was normal (E-33, 
34). The GH2 vent arm retracted and latched with no rebound. 
Some slack in the static retract lanyard caused the cable to 
contact the facility X-brace during latchback (OTV 060, E-41, 
42, 48, 50) 
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the hoiddown posts. No 
debris fell from any of the aft skirt HDP DCS/stud holes. Two 
pieces of shim material fell from the HDP #3 area at liftoff 
(E-10) 
Numerous pieces of SRB throat plug material were ejected out of 
the RB SRB exhaust hole after T-0 (E-1, 5, 15, 25). Numerous 
white objects in the plume (after the vehicle cleared the 
tower) were most likely pieces of ice from the cryogenic 
cross-country lines. A particularly large piece was visible at 
frame 1732, E-60. A piece of SRB sound suppression water trough 
material was visible near the north side of the LH2 TSM after 
liftoff (E-3, frame 4874) 
Water vapor/condensate trailed from the rudder/speed brake 
drain hole after liftoff (E-40). 
Three flashes, most likely debris-induced, occurred in the SSNE 
plume during ascent (TV-4A, TV-21A, E-222). 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters as pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of RCS 
paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings 
(E-212, 213, 222) 
An electromagnetic disturbance was detected by UHF Receiver #4 
and the Lightning Detector and Ranging System (LDAR) in the 
vicinity of the vehicle 47-50 seconds MET. Although localized 
flow condensation formed on various parts of the vehicle during 
ascent, no sign of the electrostatic discharge event was 
visible on the long range trackers. 
Movement of the body flap was similar to previous flights 
(E-212) 
Local flow condensation at various points on the vehicle was 
typical (E-207, 213, 222). Exhaust plume recirculation appeared 
typical. SRB plume tailoff and separation appeared normal 
(E-208, 212) . 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts appeared normal. 
Main parachute deployment, reefing, inflation, and jettison at 
splash down was nominal. Howevei, one chute on the RH SRB 
was ripped or torn approximately 25 feet in length along a 
seam. Nozzle severance debris was typical (E-301, 302) 
42
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A dark, slender, debris object fell from the right aft 
RCS stinger area and was most likely a tile gap filler 
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A 3" x 0.5" GSE shim fell from the LH2 T-0 umbilical

carrier plate shortly after T-0
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	0	 6.3 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew and thirty-four hand 
held still images and a 16mm motion picture film were obtained 
of the ET after separation from the Orbiter. OV-102 was 
equipped to carry three umbilical cameras. The 16mm camera with 
the 10mm lens failed to run on this flight. Direct sunlight on 
the umbilical cameras made analysis of these films more 
difficult. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. There appeared 
to be no anomalies or venting of gaseous hydrogen from the 
ET/ORB LH2 umbilical recirculation line 4-inch valve (ET side). 
No IFA's were proposed as a result of this film analysis. 
SRB separation from the ET was nominal. Separation of the -Y 
ET/SRB upper and diagonal struts appeared normal. No loss of 
TPS from the upper strut fairing was visible though small 
pieces of ET foam fell aft before and after SRB separation. No 
anomalies were observed on the LH SRB segment cases and joints, 
forward skirt, and frustum. The left forward BSM aero heat 
shield covers were fully opened and latched. 
ET separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. The BSM burn 
• scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies were observed 
on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, 
flight door, bipod ramps, aft hard point, and aft dome acreage. 
Three long, slender objects, possibly pieces of white RTV 
appeared as the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical separated/ vented. One of 
the objects appeared in front of the vertical cable tray 
(frame 2900; two of the objects originated from an area behind 
the cable tray (frame 3480). 
Six divots, 6-8 inches in diameter, were present in the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange closeout: 4 in the -Y+Z quadrant and 2 
in the -Y--Z quadrant. One 8-inch divot occurred in the inter-
tank acreage between the left bipod ramp closeout and the -Y 
thrust panel (-Y+Z quadrant). At least 15-20 small "popcorn" 
type divots were visible on intertank stringer heads in an area 
just forward of the bipods. Two of those divots, measuring 6 
inches in length, occurred just forward of the left bipod 
spindle area. 
The right bipod jack pad closeout was missing and green primer 
exposed. Due to sun angle/image degradation, no detail on the 
left jack pad closeout could be discerned. 
Five 6-inch divots were present in the LH2 tank acreage: one 
aft of the RH bipod ramp and four in the -Y+Z quadrant near the 
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. S
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Erosion and "popcorning" on the L02 feedline flange closeouts 
and support brackets was typical. TPS erosion had also occurred 
on several of the pressurization line support ramps and on the 
+Y thrust strut flange closeout. Nine small divots were visible 
in the LH2 tank acreage in the general area of XT-1973. 
Frozen hydrogen, but no TPS or structural damage, was visible 
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical interface. Erosion and charring of 
TPS on the aft surfaces of the LH2 umbilical support structure 
and cable tray was typical. One intact piece of hydrogen fire 
detection butcher paper was still attached by one side of the 
adhesive 
TPS was missing from the L02 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray 
horizontal section. More than usual erosion and numerous divots 
were visible on the cable tray vertical section. 
Plume recirculation and aft dome heating caused the usual 
charring and "popcorning" of the NCFI foam.
. 
C 
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.SRB separation from the ET was nominal. Tailoff of the Booster 
Separation Motors in the LH frustum is still visible. Erosion 
and charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of the LH2 umbilical 
support structure and cable tray was typical. Note intact piece 
of hydrogen fire detection paper still attached by one side of 
the adhesive (arrow)
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Frozen hydrogen, but no TPS or structural damage, was visible 
•	 on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical interface. There appeared to be no 
anomalies or venting of gaseous hydrogen from the recirculation 
line 4-inch valve (ET side).
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The right (+Y) bipod jack pad closeout IS 
primer exposed. Three 6-inch divots are 
acreage TPS near the intertarik splice. 
shallow divots occurred in the intertank 
the bipods.
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was missing and green 
visible in the LH2 tank 
At least 15-20 small, 
acreage TPS forward of 
.
. 
0
Six divots, 6-8 inches in diametr, were present in the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange closeout. One 8-inch divot occurred in 
• the intertank acreage between the left bipod ramp and the -y 
thrust panel. Four 6-inch divots are visible in the LH2 tank 
acreage TPS near the intertank splice. 
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0	 6.4 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of seven 16mm high speed films were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when 
the landing gear was extended. Touchdown of the main gear was 
nominal. 
The drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before 
the nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment 
appeared nominal though the parachute risers contacted the 
vertical stabilizer "stinger" tiles. A crosswind blew the drag 
chute to the right of the Orbiter centerline. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout. 
S
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7.0 SP.B POST FLIGRTIRETRIEV2L DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 28 April 1993 from 0900 to 
1100 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good 
condition. 
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RI! frustum was missing no TPS, but had 32 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint 
had occurred along the 395 ring (Figure 7) . All BSM aero 
heatshield covers were locked in the fully opened position, 
though the two left cover attach rings had been bent by 
parachute riser entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing 
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. 
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems 
tunnel cover ,
 and around the ETISRB attach point (Figure 8). No 
pins were missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward 
separation bolt appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
K5NA closeout material, 3" x 2" in size, was missing from the 
upper strut fairing. All .three aft booster stiffener rings also 
appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate 
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. The aft skirt acreage TPS was 
generally in good condition but was missing a 3-inch diameter 
piece of MSA-2 on ring frame 1894 fasteners near the 
-Y axis 
(Figure 9). 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated, 
though an NSI detonator was wedged between the HDP #4 stud hole 
wall and the DCS plunger. A piece of the HDP #4 EPON shim may 
have been detached prior to splashdown. Part of the HDP #3 
inboard sidewall EPON shim material was missing prior to water 
impact and may have been the two pieces observed in the film 
review falling from the aft skirt foot/holddown post area. 
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The RH frustum was missing no
	 but had 32 t-hA-: debonds 
. over fasteners. All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in 
the fully opened position, though the two left cover attach 
rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. 
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. The RH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or 
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were 
intact.
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K5NA, 3"x2 T' in size, was missing from the upper strut fairing
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S Although the DCS plunger was seated, an NSI detonator was 
wedged between the HDP #4 stud hole wall and the plunger 
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0	 7.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum had a total of 21 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. 
A 1-inch diameter piece of MSA-2 was missing from an area be-
tween the 275 and 318 ring frames near the -z axis (Figure 10). 
Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint had occurred 
along the 395 ring. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked 
in the fully opened position, though the two left cover attach 
rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. 
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing 
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. 
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB 
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover (Figure 11). No 
pins were missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward 
separation bolt appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
K5NA closeout material, 5" 'x 1" in size, was missing from the 
. upper strut fairing. All three aft booster stiffener rings 
appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts 
were intact and no K5NA material was missing. A debond, 8 
inches in circumferential length by 0.5 inches deep, was 
detected at the 145 degree radial position on the aft factory 
joint. A K5NA repair was missing from this same location. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaxninated. The 
K5NA closeouts' (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. Five areas of MSA-2, the largest of 
which measured 3" x 2.5 11 , were missing from the aft skirt 
acreage TPS. Two other 3 inch diameter areas of MSA-2 were 
debonded. Samples were removed for analysis (Figure 12) 
The HDP #5 DCS plunger was obstructed by frangible nut halves. 
The other three DCS plungers were properly seated. HDP #8 EPON 
shim material, 12" x 3" in size, was missing prior to 
splashdown. The substrate was sooted/charred. 
S
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The LH frustum had a total of 21 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. 
The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened 
position, though the two left cover attach rings had been bent 
by parachute riser entanglement. 
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LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or 
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were 
intact.
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S Post flight condition of the aft booster and aft skirt. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, lEA covers, and aft booster 
stiffener rings appeared undamaged. 
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Five areas of MSA-2, the largest of which measured 3" x 2.5",

were missing from the aft skirt acreage MSA-2. 
68
ORrLL P/CE

COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
1-
S
•W4 - 
So	 t4
Ah 
, 
I	 ,, \t '
-	
*4 
1"•
, 
	
4 I ' 	 $
io 
if 
AL 
4!
*
1:1 
V 
3	 l
.11 
- V 
WK-
AFTN
I 
r	 :. ç 
JL
J;3	 p 4 
4i
L 
'I ? 
I I 
. 
Two areas of MSA-2 were debonded on the aft skirt acreage
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S The HDP #5 Debris Containment System plunger was obstructed by frangible nut halves. The other three DCS plungers were properly seated.
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0	 3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
STS-55 was the fifteenth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
A recent change to the disassembly procedures by SRB Project 
(DCN 009 1OMNL-0035) eliminated the weighing of frangible nut 
pieces and ordnance fragments in the DCS containers unless: 1) 
debris is observed in the launch films; 2) the DCS plunger has 
an anomalous appearance during disassembly; or, 3) visual 
inspection of the expected DCS contents reveals the absence of 
any pieces. 
An NSI detonator was wedged between the HDP #4 DCS plunger and 
the stud hole wall. The HDP #5 DCS plunger was obstructed by 
frangible nut halves. Due to these discrepancies, the contents 
of the DCS #4 and #5 housings were weighed. A total of 0.715 S	 pounds of debris were lost (most likely at water impact) from the HDP #5 DCS. 
% of Nut without	 % of Ordnance 
HDP #	 2 Large Halves	 Fragments	 % Overall 
4 .	 99	 97	 99 
5	 60	 20	 43 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
S
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
	 0 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was 
conducted 6-7 May 1993 at the Ames-Dryden Flight Research 
Facility (ADFRF)/Edwards Air Force Base (E.AFB) on Runway 22 and 
in the Mate-Demate Device (MDD). This inspection was performed 
to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris 
sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 143 hits, of 
which 13 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This 
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat 
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume 
recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 
39 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding 
missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had 
damage from known debris sources), indicates that the total 
number of hits is near average and the number of hits one inch 
or larger is less than average (reference Figures 13-16) 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 128 hits, of 
which 10 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
majority of this damage occurred near the ET/ORB umbilicals. 
Seventy-four hits, including 2 greater than 1-inch, were 
clustered inboard and aft of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cavity. 
Similar clusters have been observed on previous flights and are 
attributed to impacts from the umbilical purge barrier and/or 
ice at ET separation. 
The following table breaks down the STS-55 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"
	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 10 128 
Upper surface 0 6 
Right side 1 1 
Left side 1 3 
Right OMS Pod 1 5 
Left OMS Pod 0 0 
TOTALS 13 143
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in excellent condition for a landing on a concrete 
runway. However, RH MLG inboard tire tread exhibited some 
localized separation from the casing. 
The RH ET/ORB attach point (EO-3) hole plugger was obstructed 
by. a frangible nut half (PR PYR2-15-0124) . Two ordnance 
fragments (P/N SKD26100-099-409 and NBS-RF1-8) were found on 
the runway below the L02 ET/ORB umbilical after the ET doors 
were opened. EO-1 and EO-2 ET/Orbiter separation devices 
appeared to have functioned properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical 
separation ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. 
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FIGURE 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 16. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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During separation of the External Tank from the Orbiter, an MPS 
sensor indicated the LH2 recirculation line valve may not have 
closed properly. Photography from the umbilical camera showed 
no anomalies on the ET side of the LH2 disconnect. Visual 
inspection of the Orbiter LH2 recirculation line interface 
after landing revealed the disconnect actuator (PD3) was in the 
open position (should have been closed) . The disconnect flapper 
was in the proper position since it is spring loaded closed and 
cannot cycle without the ET disconnect in place. The seal plate 
behind the flapper exhibited some deformation. The disconnect 
will be replaced. 
All Orbiter windows exhibited typical hazing with the greatest 
amount present on windows #3 and #4. Surface wipes were taken 
from windows #1-8 for laboratory analysis (Figure 17). 
Tile damage on the base heat shield was less than usual. The 
SS4E Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket sacrifi-
cial panels were intact and undamaged. A one-foot square oval 
shaped area of residue was present on the SSME #3 engine 
mounted heat shield (EMHS) at the 4:00 o'clock position. The 
tan colored residue was sampled for laboratory analysis (Figure 
17) 
Runway 22 had been swept/inspected by Air Force personnel on 
S May 6, 1993, and all potentially damaging debris was removed. The post landing walkdown of Runway 22 was performed immediately after landing. No organic (bird) debris or 
non-flight hardware was found on the runway. 
Eleven pieces of black tile were recovered in the approximate 
area of the drag chute deployment. These tile fragments 
originated from the rudder/speed brake "stinger", which is an 
area damaged on previous uses of the drag chute by contact with 
the parachute riser lines. This flight marked the eighth use of 
the Orbiter drag chute. Aside from the damage to the vertical 
stabilizer stinger, the drag chute appeared to have functioned 
nominally. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared 
to be in good condition. 
A portable Minolta/Land Cyclops infrared spot radiometer was 
used to measure the surface temperatures of three areas on the 
Orbiter (per OMRSD V09AJO.095) . Twenty-two minutes after 
landing, the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 160 degrees Fahrenheit. 
Fifty-two minutes after landing, the PH wing leading edge RCC 
panel #9 was 78 degrees F and panel #17 was 82 degrees F. 
(Figure 18). 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
near average and the number of hit& one inch or larger was less 
than average when compared to previous missions (Figures 
19-20) 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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FIGURE 18. STS-55 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS 0	 RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER 
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
FIGURE 19: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
. 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HrrS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HfrS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS- 11(41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS- 17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-!) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 11•1. 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
STS-47 3 48 11 108 
STS-52 6 152 16 290 
STS-53 11 145 23 240 
STS-54 14 80 14 131 
STS-56 18 94 36 156 
AVERAGE 14.7 93.2 224 133.1 
SIGMA 74 46.0 10.9 61.8 
$TS.55 128 1$ 143
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
. 
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The orbiter O lower surface sustained a total of 128 hits. The 
majority of this damage occurred in a cluster near the ET/ORB 
S LH2 umbilical. Similar clusters have been observed on previous flights and are attributed to impacts from the umbilical purge barrier and/or ice during ascent. 
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I. 
Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORE umbilical. All separation 
•	 ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
83
ORNAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH 
Ak 
: 
/	 ?1 F 
1' 
Visual inspection of the LH2 4-inch line interface revealed the 
.	 rack (arrow) was extended and protruding beyond the nominal 
mold line. The seal plate behind the flapper exhibited some 
deformation.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical.
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The right ET/ORE attach point (EO-3) hole plugger had 
not seated and was obstructed by a frangible nut half 
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Two ordnance fragments were found on the runway below the
L02 ET/ORB umbilical after the ET doors were opened 
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SAll Orbiter windows exhibited typical hazing with the 
greatest amount present on windows #3 and #4 
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•
A 1-foot square oval-shaped area of residue was present on the 
SSME #3 engine mounted heat shield at the 4:00 o'clock position 
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.. 
Eleven black tile fragments were found on the runway in the 
general area of drag chute deployment. The tile pieces S originated from the vertical stabilizer "stinger", which is an area damaged on previous uses of the drag chute by contact with 
the parachute riser lines.
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0	 9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-102 Columbia 
during the STS-55 post landing debris assessment at Dryden 
Flight Research Facility DFRF-EAFB (reference Figure 17). The 
submitted samples consisted of 8 window wipes (Windows 1-8). 
The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical 
Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison 
to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves the placing 
and correlating of particles and residues with respect to 
composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. 
Debris sample results and analyses are listed by Orbiter 
location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM 
exhaust, Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS), paints and 
primer from various sources, landing site products, and organic 
materials. A finding that has been previously observed (STS-50 
vertical stabilizer sample, STS-56 window samples) was the 
presence of "E-glass" (2 samples) . Another previously observed 
finding (STS-53 windows) was the absence of metallics from 
certain window samples - windows 2 and 4 for this sample set. 
• Trace amounts of yellow paint were found in seven of the eight 
window samples and was attributed to facility/ground support 
equipment paint. Results of the organic material analysis are 
still pending. There was no apparent vehicle damage related to 
these residual findings. 
STS-56 Organic Analysis 
The final results of the STS-56 organic analysis are also shown 
in this report. Types of materials identified included those 
associated with window covers (plastic polymers, filled plastic 
PVC), RTV, and cellulosic (sample cloth) . This variety of 
residuals, which were attributed to known sources, did not 
change significantly when compared to previous sample data 
(reference Figure 21) . No new findings were found in this 
analysis. 
New Findings 
This sampling set provided one new finding in debris residual 
post-flight samples. This new finding was obtained from the 
window samples and did not appear related to any debris damage 
problem. A clear calcium-sulfur rich material was detected 
and is believed to originate from the landing site as possibly 0	 anhydrite, a material common to DFRF soil. 
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film/video review, ten Post 
Launch Anomalies, but no IFA candidates, were observed on the 
STS-55 mission. 
10_1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY 
1. A dark, slender debris object fell from the L02 TSM door 
area after the T-0 umbilical carrier plate had been retracted. 
The object fell aft without contacting flight hardware (E-17, 
frame 4255; E-20, frame 4805) 
2. A 3" x 0.5" GSE shim fell from. the LH2 T-0 umbilical 
carrier plate shortly after T-0 (E-18, frame 4206). 
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. Six divots, 6-8 inches in diameter, were present in the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange closeout: 4 in the -Y+Z quadrant and 2 
in the -Y-Z quadrant. One 8-inch divot occurred in the inter-
tank acreage between the left bipod ramp closeout and the -Y 
thrust panel (-Y+Z quadrant). At least 15-20 small "popcorn" 
type divots were visible on intertank stringer heads in an area 
just forward of the bipods. Two of those divots, measuring 6 
inches in length, occurred just forward of the left bipod 
spindle area. 
2. The right bipod jack pad closeout appeared to be missing 
and green primer was exposed. 
3. Three 6-inch divots were present in the LH2 tank acreage: 
one aft of the RH bipod ramp and two in the -Y+Z quadrant near 
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. The RH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 32 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. The LH frustum had a total of 21 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. A 1-inch diameter piece of MSA-2 was missing 
from an area between the 275 and 318 ring frames near the -z 
axis.
2. Five areas of MSA-2, the largest of which measured 3" x 
2.5 11 , were missing from the LH aft skirt acreage TPS. Two other 
3 inch diameter areas of NSA-2 were debonded. 
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3. A piece of the HDP #4 EPON shim may have been detached
	 is 
prior to splashdown. Part of the HDP #3 inboard sidewall EPON 
shim material was missing prior to water impact and may have 
been the two pieces observed in the film review falling from' 
the aft skirt foot/hoiddown post area. 
4. An NSI detonator was wedged between the HDP #4 DCS plunger 
and the stud hole wall. The HDP #5 DCS plunger was obstructed 
by frangible nut halves. 
10.4 ORBITER 
1. The RH ET/ORB attach point (EO-3) hole-plugger had not 
seated fully and was obstructed by a frangible nut half. Two 
ordnance fragments (P/N SKD26100-099-409 and NBS-RF1-8) were 
found-on the runway below the L02 ET/ORB umbilical after the ET 
doors were opened.
S 
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
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ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE PROGRAM 
2400 NASA Road 1, P. 0. Box 58561, Houston, Texas 77258-8561
	 (713)333-5411 
June 11, 1993 
Greg Katnik 
MC/rV-MSD-22 
OSB Room 5203R 
KSC, Florida 32899 
Dear Greg, 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-55 Final Report, and was completed June 
11, 1993. Publication numbers are LESC-30782 and JSC-25994-55. The actual document 
can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 of the 
- NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
Christine Dailey, Project Specialist 
Photo/TV Analysis Project 
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.2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.1	 Debris 
.
	
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras E-5, E-6, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-25, E-26, E-31, E-34, 
E-40, E-52, E-76, E-77, E-79, OTV-009, OTV-054 and OTV-063) 
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical 
disconnect areas as well as from the LH2 and L02 T-O TSM umbilical areas at Space 
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was observed to 
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested. 
2.1.1.2	 Rectangular Shaped Debris 
(Camera E-18) 
Figure 2.1.1.2	 Rectangular Shaped Debris From LH2 T-O TSM 
Umbilical Area 
A small, thin, rectangular shaped piece of debris, dark on one side and light on the other, 
fell from the LH2 T-O TSM umbilical area after umbilical disconnect. In addition, two 
small rectangular shaped pieces of debris, dark on one side and light on the other, were 
first seen at the left inboard elevon lower surface and fell aft through the field of view. 
The origin of these three pieces could not be determined from the films. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.1.2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E4, E-14, E-30, E-57) 
At least two separate fast moving pieces of SRB flame duct debris were noted coming 
from the LSRB at liftoff. On Camera E-30, debris was seen to come from the LSRB 
flame duct beginning at 14:50:01.92 UTC. It had a 2D velocity of 70 ft/sec and a size of 
approximately 4.4 inches. The debris seen on camera E-14 was first detected at 
14:50:00.307 UTC and had a 2D velocity of approximately 69 ft/second and a size of 
approximately 1.3 inches across. 
The debris seen on E-57 was first noted just to the west of the RSRB at approximately 
14:50:02 UTC and may have originated from the LSRB flame duct. The debris appeared 
to travel approximately 40 feet above base of the MLP and had a maximum 2D velocity 
of approximately 125 ft/sec. The debris seen on E-4 was first seen at approximately 
14:50:02 UTC and appeared to originate from the LSRB flame duct. It had a 2D velocity 
of approximately 136 ft/sec. 
Although it can not be confirmed, it appears, based on the times and velocities, that the 
debris seen on cameras E-4 and E-57 may have been the same object. The debris seen on 
camera E-30 was seen at the same time as the debris seen in cameras E-4 and E-57 but 
the velocity was much less and thus may not have been the same piece of debris. The 
debris seen on camera E-14 was probably a separate object since it was too small to be 
the object seen on E-30 and too slow to be the object seen on E-4 and E-57. For more 
details on this analysis see Appendix D, Task #7. 
2.1.3	 Debris after Liftoff 
2.13.1	 RCS Paper and Baggie Material Debris 
(Cameras E-52, E-57, E-63, E-65, E-76, E-77, E213, E-222, E-223) 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at 
liftoff and throughout ascent on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris sightings 
were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice/baggie material from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Two pieces of light colored debris (possibly ice) fell from the ET 
L02 feed line upper bellows at liftoff. None of the debris was observed to strike the 
vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested. 
2.1.3.2	 Debris Reported by Crew (Task #10) 
Shortly after launch, the crew was asked to give a report of the debris they noted. 
Commander Steve Nagel reported that there were a few smudges on the windows but that 
they appeared normal. He also reported that after ET separation, a great deal of venting 
was noted on the left side of the Orbiter. He said the venting appeared as a water dumplet 
with a shower of very small particles. Pilot Tom Henricks reported that most of the 
debris noted was near the left side of the Orbiter. A transcript of their conversation is in 
Appendix D, Task #10. 
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•	 2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free Burning Hydrogen) 
(Cameras E-1, E-3, E-5, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-30, E-36, E-52, 
E-63, E-76, E-77, OTV.063) 
An orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, was noted beneath the SSMEs and 
drifted under the body flap prior to SSME ignition. This phenomenon has been noted on 
many previous missions. 
2.2.2	 Discoloration in SSME Plume After SSME Ignition 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-15, E-16, E-20, E-63 and OTV-151) 
Figure 2.2.2	 SSME #2 Plume Discoloration 
A white discoloration was noted in the SSME #2 mach diamond at 0.144 seconds MET. 
This type of phenomenon has been seen on several previous missions. 
.
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Electro-Magnetic Disturbance (Task # 13) 
The MER reported that at 47 to 50 seconds MET, the Lightning Detector and Ranging 
System (LDAR) and the UHF Receiver #4 simultaneously registered an electromagnetic 
disturbance. The preliminary conclusion by the JSC Tracking and Communications 
Division is that there was a dielectric breakdown between the Shuttle and the surrounding 
atmosphere. This atmospheric breakdown precipitated an electrostatic discharge due to 
prior P-static charge buildup, a low amplitude lightning strike, or a combination of the 
two. 
Visual Analysis: 
The following STS-55 launch videos and films were re-screened to see if there was any 
visual manifestation of an electromagnetic disturbance between 47.98 to 50.29 seconds 
MET: KTV-13, KTV-21A, ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212, ET-213, KTV-4A, E-52, 
E-54, E-204, E-205, E-208, E-213, E-222. No visual indication of a possible 
electromagnetic disturbance was found. On cameras E-54, E-213, and E-222, the vehicle 
is visible continuously from liftoff through 54 seconds MET and beyond. These views 
indicate that the vehicle was not, in visible moisture during the 47 to 50 second time 
period. 
On KTV-4A, a condensation "collar" formed around the forward portion of the SLV after 
the roll maneuver. The condensation collar is no longer visible after 44 seconds MET. 
The condensation starts to reappear at 50 seconds MET, again at 51 seconds MET and 
finally is distinctly visible at 54 seconds MET. There is no visible indication of 
. condensation around the SLV on any of the tracking video and film camera views during 
the 47 to 50 second time period when the electromagnetic disturbance was registered on 
the LDAR and the UHF receiver. 
Pre-Launch STS-55 Trajectory Data: 
An examination of the STS-55 pre-launch trajectory data shows that at 47.04 seconds 
MET the vehicle was at an altitude of 21,792 feet and a velocity of mach 0.98. At 48 
seconds MET the vehicle was at 22,649 feet and a velocity of mach 1.00. At 50.88 
seconds MET the vehicle was at 25,295 feet and a velocity of mach 1.07. 
Environmental Analysis: 
Rawinsonde Data: Vertical moisture profile indicated moisture layers at 17,856 ft (68%) 
and 29,836 ft (44%). These layers by themselves do not conclusively prove that clouds 
existed at launch but the relative humidities do not rule out clouds either. It should also 
be noted that this data was gathered 30 minutes before launch and may not reflect 
conditions at launch. A table containing the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
Rawinsonde Data for April 26, 1992 at 14:20:00 GMT is located in Appendix E. 
GOES7 Satellite Imagery: Broad-scale satellite imagery taken at 15:01:00 GMT 
indicates thin cirrus clouds existed over the launch corridor during ascent. Cirrus clouds 
are very difficult to detect in the visible spectrum (nearly optically transparent) which 
may explain why the visual analysis was inconclusive. GOES7 thermal imagery (11.5 
microns) is better suited to detect thin cirrus and, in fact, did detect these clouds in the 
launch corridor. 
is
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•	 Origin of Cirrus Clouds Observed at Launch: 
Examining a single pair of GOES visible and infrared data cannot provide conclusive 
evidence of the origin of the cirrus clouds observed at launch. Rawinsonde data does aid 
the estimated trajectory of these clouds. The winds carrying the clouds were from about 
290 degrees (west-north-west). Moving up-stream in this direction on the GOES7 
satellite image, an area of thunderstorms and thunderstorm anvils or debris is found along 
an axis from offshore Apalachicola, Florida through Charleston, South Carolina. The 
proximity of these active thunderstorms along with the general flow pattern suggests the 
possibility that the cirrus clouds over the launch corridor were of a thunderstorm debris 
nature. If this is the case, it is also possible that these same clouds may have carried a 
residual charge (positive) that could have been dissipated onto the Orbiter and its 
associated contrail as the Orbiter passed through the (potentially) charged cirrus debris 
layer. 
2.3.2	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
(Cameras E-18 and E-212) 
The amount of body flap motion seen at SSME ignition did not warrant further analysis. 
At present, there is an ongoing study of this type of motion on OV- 103 missions. 
There was also slight body flap motion visible during ascent as the vehicle passed 
through Max-Q (the region of maximum dynamic pressure). Once again, the amount of 
motion seen on this mission did not require further analysis. However, a table listing 
those missions where numerical analysis has been performed in the past is listed in 
Appendix D, Task #4- Body Flap Motion. 
2.33	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras E-204, E-208, E-218, ET-208, KTV-13) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the alt end of the SLY prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-55 the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 94 seconds MET on E-204 and the end was noted at 
approximately 110 seconds MET on Camera KTV-13. See Appendix D, Task #1 for a 
summary of recirculation start and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET) 
KTV-13 95 111 
ET-208 - - 
E-204 102 112 
*E208 94 110 
E-218 - -
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION 
NOTE: Intermittent LOY of the vehicle due to clouds prevented acquisition of specific 
start and stop times for recirculation on cameras ET-208 and E-218. 
.
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2.4	 DTO-312 
2.4.1	 Analysis of Onboard Photography of the ET (Task #6) 
(STS-55-71-001 through -034) 
Figure 2.4.1	 Divots on the External Tank 
Thirty-four photographs of the ET after separation were taken by the crew between 
15:03:39 UTC and 15:22:49 UTC with a Hasseiblad 70 mm format camera configured 
with a 250 mm lens. Five divots were seen on the +Y+Z area near the L112 intertank 
close-out. Divot 1 (see Figure 2.4. 1) is on the close-out area and divots 2 through 5 are 
below it. A sixth divot, not shown in the figure above, was noted on the +Y-Z area on the 
LH2 intertank close-out. Based on scaling the divots by the diameter of the ET, the 
divots ranged in size from 4.7 inches (divot 4) to 19.9 inches (divot 6). At the time of the 
first photograph, the ET was 1130 meters from the orbiter. At the time the last 
photograph, the ET was 8677 meters away from the orbiter. Further details are given in 
Appendix D, Task #6. 
S
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Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5) 
16 mm Views of SRB and ET Separation 
2.4.2 
.
	
2.4.2.1
S 
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
S
Figure 2.4.2.1	 16 mm Camera View of the LH2 Umbilical 
A 16 mm motion picture film was taken from the Orbiter umbilicals and reviewed. This 
motion picture film showed LSRB and ET separation along with the normal venting and 
debris associated with these events. Due to the large amount of debris seen be the crew 
after ET separation, it was thought that perhaps the LH2 4" purge valve may not have 
closed properly. The 4" purge line appeared normal and no venting was noted from the 
ET. Poor imagery due to sun glint significantly hindered analysis. Normal TPS erosion 
was noted. No anomalies were detected. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
•	 2.41.2	 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of the ET Separation 
Fifty-nine well focused 35 mm frames were obtained of the external tank separation. 
These frames showed multiple small white areas (probably TPS erosion) near the aft 
dome and L02 feed line. A bright glare hampered analysis on the nineteenth frame. The 
photography also showed two of the five divots near the LH2 intertank close-out area 
which were also seen on the 70 mm Hasselbiad magazine (See Section 2.4.1). The 
screening sheets are located in Appendix D, Task #5. 
2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3) 
(Camera E-1034R) 
Camera E-1034R was used to determine the left main gear sink rate. Data was gathered 
for 25 frames prior to and throughout landing, approximately 1 second. This film did not 
contain timing. However, left main gear touchdown occurred at frame 404 which was 
timed to be 126:14:29:58.982 UTC as seen on DTV 1. Drag chute initiation occurred at 
frame 811 and 126:14:30:14.973 UTC as seen on DTV 4. The 407 frames took 15.991 
seconds or 25.45 frames per second. Scale was determined using the photographic 
distance of the diameter of the inside left main gear tire. To find the height of the main 
gear above the runway was determined by multiplying the image distance by the scale. 
These heights were plotted with respect to time to find the actual main gear sink rate. 
The analysis showed that the main gear sink rate was 3.46 feet per second. A graph 
depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D, Task #3. No nose gear sink rate 
•	 information was collected from film due to lack of timing information. 
2.5.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video (Task #3) 
(Camera DTV-1) 
Camera DTV-1 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered 
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30 frames per 
second. Scalar information was determined by a system of equations which took into 
account the orientation of the orbiter relative to the camera. The equations were solved 
for each observation which took into account the change in perspective as well as 
increase in size. The vertical distance between the average position of the main gear and 
the runway was then multiplied by the scale to find the height of the main gear above the 
runway. These heights were then regressed with respect to time to find the actual main 
gear sink rate. The analysis showed that the main gear sink rate was 3.55 feet per second. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 18 seconds after main gear touchdown. 
Camera DTV-1 was used to determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Data was gathered 
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30 frames per 
second. Scalar information was found for nose gear sink rate in the same manner in 
which it was found for main gear sink rate. The vertical distance between the nose gear 
position and the average position of the main gear was then multiplied by the scale to find 
the vertical distance between the nose gear and the main gear. The difference between 
the radius of the main gear and nose gear tires was then added to this distance to find the 
height of the nose gear above the runway. These heights were then regressed with respect 
to time to find the actual nose gear sink rate. This rate was determined to be 3.18 feet per 
second. Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D, Task #3. 
S
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2.53	 Drag Chute Performance(Task #9) 
(Cameras DTV-1, D7V4) 
Drag chute veers off centerline 
- 
Figure 2.5.3	 Drag Chute Veers From Center Line of the Orbiter 
Video coverage of the drag chute deploy was obtained. The deployment of the drag chute 
appeared as expected. The drag chute was seen to veer to the right after deployment (See 
Figure 2.5.3). Analysis of the drag chute performance was not done this mission due to 
limited film coverage, the lack of timing, and the fact that the drag chute has been 
modified since STS-55 and this configuration will no longer be used. 
All drag chute times were obtained from camera DTV- 1 except for initiation which was 
obtained from camera DTV-4. 
14:30:14.973 UTC Drag chute initiation 
14:30:15.965 UTC Pilot chute inflation 
14:30:17.600 UTC Drag chute inflation in reefed configuration 
14:30:21.037 UTC Drag chute inflation in disreefed configuration 
14:30:40.690 UTC Drag chute release
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.5.4	 Post Landing Orbiter Inspection 
Bolt protrudes irom IJH urnhiltcal 4 lineattact 
(A)
Possible missing ITS at the 
nozzle interface of SSME #3 
fr
/ 
(B) 
.
Missing tile surface on st 
below vertical stabilizer 
I 
Figures 2.5.4 A, B, and C	 (A) Bolt With Hexagonal Nut, (B) Possible 
Missing TPS at Base of SSME #3 (C) Missing 
Tile Surface on Stinger 
The following items were noted during the post-landing inspection of the Orbiter: 
A bolt with a hexagonal nut was seen protruding approximately 5/16" from the LH2 
umbilical in the attach associated with the 4" recirculation line (See Figure 2.5.4 A). 
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Missing tile surface material was noted on the stinger below the vertical stabilizer (See 
Figure 2.5.3 B). Possible missing TPS was noted in the SSME #3 nozzle interface area just inside the dome mounted heat shield at the three o'clock position (See Figure 2.5.3 
Q. 
2.6	 Other Normal Events 
Other normal events observed include: frost buildup on SSME purge vent nozzles, 
ice/frost debris and vapor from the LH2 and L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical areas at SSME 
start up through liftoff, frost on ET GOX vent louvers, ice/frost debris and vapor from the 
GUCP at disconnect, ice/frost debris and vapor from the L02 T-O TSM and the LH2 T-O 
TSM disconnects at liftoff, ET twang, motion of the elevons and body flap at SSME 
startup and liftoff, vapor from the rudder speed brake drain port, ET aft dome outgassing, 
vapor from the SRB stiffener rings, minor pad debris in SLY exhaust plume, expansion 
waves, flares in the SSME plumes, white puffs in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll 
maneuver, body flap motion during ascent, charring of the ET aft dome, linear optical 
distortions, recirculation, plume brightening, and debris in SRB plume after SRB 
separation. 
2.7	 STS-55 Abort Analysis (Task #11) 
2.7.1	 Screening Activities 
On Monday, March 31, 1993, the liftoff of Columbia was aborted after the SSMEs were 
shutdown at startup. Eight videos and twenty-one films were screened. An events 
timeline was created and can be found along with the screening information in Appendix 
.	 D, Task #11. Other significant events that were not considered anomalies were noted 
during screening and are explained in Section 2.7. 
2.7.1.1	 Pre-Launch ET Tanking Screening 
(Cameras OTV-009, OTV-040, OTV-054, OTV-063, OTV-064) 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER) engineering views were screened real-time during the 
tanking of the external tank which began approximately 8 hours prior to launch. The 
usual vapors and water drops were noted during tanking. White debris (probably frost) 
was noted to form on the ET/Orbiter umbilical baggie material at the liquid hydrogen 
(1,112) disconnect. No anomalies were detected. See Appendix D, Task #11 for the 
tanking timeline. 
.
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2.7.1.2	 Significant Events 
2.7.1.2.1	 Shutdown of SSME #3 
(Cameras E-3, E-5, E-15, E-17, E-19, E-20, E-62, E-77, OTV-051S, 
OTV-070S, 0TV-071S) 
Figure 2.7.1.2.1	 Shut Down of SSME #3 
During the launch attempt of STS-55, SSME #3 was shut down by its main engine 
controller when a higher than allowable pressure reading showed up in a purge line (See 
Figure 2.7.1.2.1). The general purpose computers, responding to SSME #3 controller's 
report of a shutdown, began shutting down SSME #2 and then SSME #1. After all three 
engines were shut down, saling procedures that include a series of valve closures, leak 
checks and fire detection checks began. Thousands of gallons of water were then sprayed 
on the engines to extinguish any fires that may have been present. 
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2.7.1.2.2	 Rectangular Shaped Debris 0	 (Camera E-18) 
Figure 2.7.1.2.2	 Rectangular Shaped Debris 
A yellow , flexible, rectangular appearing piece of debris moved from left to right across 
the field of view. The origin was possibly the LH2 TSM T-O umbilical area. 
2.7.1.2.3	 Orange Vapor at SSME Ignition 
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-5, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-36, 
E-52, E-61, E-62, E-77, KTV-4AS, OTV-070S, 0TV-071S) 
Orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, was noted below the SSMEs and above 
the rims of the SSMEs. It was also noted to travel beneath the body flap at SSME 
ignition. 
S
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2.7.1.2.4	 Orange Vapor/Flames and Burning Debris Near LH2 TSM Umbilical 
(Cameras E-2, E-18, E-30) 
Figure 2.7.1.2.4 (A)	 Orange Vapor/Flames Near LH2 T-O 
TSM Umbilical 
Orange vapor or flames were noted at the lower lines of the LH2 T-O umbilical area. 
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Figure 2.7.1.2.4 (B)	 Burning RCS Paper 
RCS paper from the left RCS stinger ignited and burned after engine shutdown. Pieces of 
the burning RCS paper were noted to drift across the field of view throughout the 
sequence. 
2.7.2	 Other Normal Events 
FSS deluge water, body flap motion at SSME ignition, frost build up on SSME purge 
vent nozzles, APU venting on the RSRB, engine purge deluge water, and aft fuselage 
deluge water. 
S
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-55, the fourteenth flight of the 
Orbiter Columbia was conducted April 26, 1993 at approximately 
9:50 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39A (LC-39A), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive photographic and 
video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to determine 
proper operation of the ground and flight hardware. Cameras 
(video and cine) providing this coverage are located on the fixed 
service structure (FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39B 
perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and downrange tracking 
sites. 
II.	 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-55 included, but were not limited to the 
following:
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
C. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Hoiddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission: 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-five of fifty-six requested 
cameras as well as video from all twenty-four requested cameras. 
The following table illustrates the camera data received at MSFC 
for STS-55.
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-55 
16mm 35nun 70mm Video 
MLP 22 0 0 4 
FSS 7 0 0 3 
Perimeter 3 3 0 6 
Tracking 0 15 0 11 
Onboard 3 1 1 0 
Totals 35 19 1 24
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
.
	
	
Photographic coverage of STS-55 was considered good. 
Tracking camera coverage was degraded due to cloud cover and 
atmospheric conditions. Camera E-220 did not run due a 
mechanical failure. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly and 
recorded data through water impact. The astronauts carried a 
70mm hand-held camera to record film for evaluating the ET TPS 
integrity after ET separation. Thirty-one frames of data were 
recorded. Also a 16 mm Arriflex camera was used to record data 
of the ET after separation. Two 16mm motion picture cameras and 
one 35mm still camera were flown on this mission in the orbiter's 
umbilical well to record the SRB and ET separation events. The 
16mm camera with the 10mm lens did not run. 
IV.	 ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the S
	
	
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals; 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
121 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors and 
purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon 
motions were noted during ascent.
	
0 
b. SRB Main Parachute Rip 
At first disreef a large rip was observed in one of the 
parachutes on the right SRB. The rip is approximately 1/8 of the 
diameter of the parachute or approximately 30 feet. Figure 1 is 
a frame of film from camera E-301 showing the rip. 
c. ET TPS Divots 
Thirty-one frames of 70mm film of the ET after separation 
were received and reviewed. Four divots were noted on the LH2 
tank to the left of the forward bipod and two divots noted at the 
LH2/intertank scarf joint. Figure 2 is a frame of film taken 
from the 70mm on board camera showing these divots. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the SRB 
hoiddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 	 is 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION	 TIME (UTC) 
M-1	 E-9	 116:14:50:00.024 
M-2	 E-8	 116:14:50:00.025 
M-5	 E-12	 116:14:50:00.025 
M-6	 E-13	 116:14:50:00.024 
b. ET Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 30.5 inches. Figure 3 is a data plot showing 
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and 
vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
C. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-56 was determined to be 
116:14:52:05.55 UTC as recorded by camera E-207.	 0 
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Space Transportation Systems Division 
Rockwell International Corporation 
12214  Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California 90241 
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In Reply Refer to 93MA2124 
.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-1 8500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-55 (Launch Abort) and 
STS-55 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 08244). 
The scheduled launch of STS-55 on March 22, 1993 was aborted at T-3 seconds 
(6:51 am PST/GMT 081:14:50:54.956) due to a problem with SSME#3. 
As a result of the launch abort several films were selected by MSFC and JSC to 
provide possible data in the evaluation of the STS-55 launch abort. 
Rockwell received 21 films for the photographic evaluation effort. One film, E-76 
was not available due to camera malfunction. 
Review of films E-19 and E-20 did not identify any visual anomalies or other off-
nominal occurrences on the external surfaces of the three SSME's. Ignition of 
SSMEs #3 and #2 appeared to stop during startup and no Mach diamond was 
formed. A Mach diamond was noted on SSME #1 which dissipated about half a 
second later. After the engine's shutdown, frost was noted forming on the 
nozzles. 
After SSME shutdown, an orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was 
noted drifting upward to the base heat shield, vertical stabilizer, and under the 
body flap on cameras E-5 and E-17. 
Two rectangular, flexible pieces of debris were seen moving left to right across 
the field of view on cameras E-16 (frame 4750) and E-18 (frame 4630). KSC stated 
that the debris may be pieces of purge barrier (baggie) tape. 
On cameras E-2, E-16, E-18, and E-20, pieces of burning debris (RCS paper 
covrs) were noted falling through the field of view. Burning RCS paper has 
been seeri on previous missions and is a normal event. 
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Several oscillations (ET tip deflection or twang motion) were noted of the ET tip 
on camera E-79. ET tip deflection is a normal event and the deflection envelope of 
55 inches (-Z=40 inches, +Z=1 5 inches) total displacement did not appear to be 
exceeded. KSC reported maximum deflection was approximately 14 inches in 
the -z direction and 9 inches in the +Z direction. 
On cameras E-60 and E-64 the engine purge deluge water spray coverage of the 
LH2i'L02 T-O umbilical disconnects did not appear to be the same for the L02 
side (E-64) as it was for the LH2 side (E-60). It was noted on camera E-64 that one 
water spray nozzle appeared to be angled too low to provide the proper water 
spray coverage. A facility check by KSC personnel determined that due to an 
alignment problem with a FIREX nozzle, no water reached the L0 2 ET/ORB 
umbilical. Corrective action was taken for the STS-56 launch. 
Other normal events reported on previous missions and observed for this aborted 
launch were ice debris from the ET/Orbiter umbilical, RCS paper debris, slight 
body flap motion and slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield, during SSME 
start-up. 
The second launch attempt of the STS-55 mission was successful and occurred 
on April 26, 1993. 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 	 40 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-55 launch conducted on 
April 26, 1993, at approximately 7:50 a.m. (PDT) from the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) and for the landing on May 6, 1993 at Edward Airforce Base (7:30 a.m. 
PDT). 
Rockwell received launch films from 83 cameras (59 cine, 24 video) and landing 
films from 12 cameras (6 cine, 6 video) to support the STS-55 photographic 
evaluation effort. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good. 
Overall, the films showed STS-55 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. Vapor 
was observed orignating from the drain hole on the aft edge of the rudder/speed 
brake at liftoff. Charring of the ET aft dome and recirculation and brightening of 
the SRB plumes were visible and normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing 
and SHE separation also appeared to be normal, although clouds hampered the 
analysis of many of the longrange tracking cameras. 
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GET2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LET 2 umbilical hydrogen 
dispersal system hardware. 
STS-55 was the fifteenth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB 
holddown support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is 
designed to increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the 
hoiddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut 
fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not 
increasing the probability of a hoiddown bolt hang-up. 
No major or significant events were observed or identified. One item that merits 
mentioning (not considered an anomaly) is the white flash from SSME#2 at 
liftoff. This event and other events noted by the Rockwell film/video users during 
the review and analysis of the STS-55 photographic items are summarized in the 
•	 following comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next 
flight. 
1. On cameras E-2, E-3, and E-20, a white flash was noted in the SSME #2 
plume at liftoff. Flashes have been observed on previous missions and are 
probably caused by small amounts of contaminants in the main engine. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
2. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen below the body flap just prior to SSME ignition on cameras OTV-063, E-1, E-3, E-5, E-17, E-19, 
E-20 and E-52. This vapor apprears to be similar to the vapor noted on 
previous missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
On camera E-18, a rectangular piece of debris was seen in the left inboard 
elevon lower surface area falling aft prior to liftoff. Also, another 
rectangular piece of debris was seen falling from the LET2 TSM umbilical 
area after umbilical disconnect. No follow-up action is planned. 
4. Multiple pieces of white debris, probably ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilical 
area, were seen falling from behind the body flap into the SSME plume after 
liftoff on cameras E-52, E-76, and E-77. No follow-up action is planned. 
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5. On cameras E-30 and E-36, two dark debris objects (probably SRB throat plug 
RTV) appeard to be moving north out of the SRB flame duct. This debris did 
not appear to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned. 
6. Multiple pieces of debris particles were seen falling aft of the Orbiter after 
completion of the roll maneuver on cameras E-212, E-213, and E-222. The 
debris were traced to the forward RCS thrusters and were pieces of the RCS 
paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
7. Flares and flashes seen in the SSME exhaust plume (KTV-4A, KTV-21A, 
E-52, E-76, E-212, E-213, E-218) during ascent. These observations have been 
seen in the SSME plumes on previous missions and are understood to be 
burning of propellant impurities including RCS paper covers. No follow-up 
action is planned. 
8. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-55. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for 
information only: 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Charring of the ET aft dome. 
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff. 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS. 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
• Slag in SRB plume after separation. 
• Condensation around the SLV during ascent. 
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff. 
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up. 
9. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
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10. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified. 
11. The landing of STS-55 occurred on the hard surface runway 22 at Edwards 
Air Force Base. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no 
anomalous events were observed.. This flight marked the eighth use of the 
Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All 
sequenced events occurred as expected and no hardware anomalies were 
observed. 
During the post-landing inspection several tiles were damaged on the right 
aft edge of the vertical stabilizer stinger. This area has sustained damage 
on previous uses of the drag chute by contact with the parachute riser lines. 
No follow-up action has been requested. 
This letter is of particular interest to Messers W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and C. F. 
Martin (MK-SIO-2) at NASA/JSC and NASAJKSC respectively. The Integration 
Contractor contact is R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
Space Systems Division 
6. 6, ap%ia-) 
J. A. Wolfelt 
Chief Engineer 
System Integration 
RRJIy 
cc:	 G. Della Longa, BC4, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
W. J. Gaylor, VF2, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
H. S. Brown, MK-SIO-2, NASAIKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
D. Pitts, SN15, NASAIJSC, Houston, Tx 
G. Katnik, TV-MSD-22, NASAJKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
B. Hoover, BICO-1, NASAIKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
T. Rieckhoff, EP55, NASA/MSFC, Huntsville, Al 
Addressee 
NASAJJSC Mail Center (Complete external distribution made via Data Management Systems) 
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